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From the standpoint of a higher socio-economic formation, the private property of 
particular individuals in the earth will appear just as absurd as the private property 
of one man in other men [i.e., slavery]. Even an entire society, a nation, or all 
simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not the owners of the earth. 
They are simply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an 
improved state to succeeding generations as ​boni patres familias ​ [good heads of 
the household] (Marx, 1976, 959) 
 
Geoengineering can be defined as the deliberate technological intervention into our 
climate in order to limit and/or reverse climate change and is currently being explored by 
governments, scientists, universities and private think tanks as an option in humanity’s 
fight against global warming. In thischapter, I argue against choosing geoengineering as a 
tactic in dealing with global warming because of: (1), substantial flaws in the 
assumptions that ground economic-centric studies; and (2), problems with how data has 
been selectively used to support its implementation. Many of these studies are 
erroneously based upon static conceptions of consumption rates, human behavior and 
basic social objectives. I also make the case that there is an alternative way to approach 
the study of climate change and environmental issues using Andrew Feenberg’s 
philosophy of technology approach (Feenberg, 1995, 1991/2002, 1999). 
 
Following a brief definition of geoengineering, I begin with an brief discussion of the 
now indefinitely postponed Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering 
(SPICE) project, which aims to test the feasibility of one specific geoengineering 
technique. I use this particular case, and a considered analysis of the studies that surround 
it, throughout this chapter as a way into an overarching analysis of the problems of 
economic methodologies that are most often applied to the assessment of climate change 
as well as geoengineering. I begin my examination of these flaws with a brief critique of 
quantitative methodologies, as they relate to the study of the environment, and follow this 
with a critical examination of demand estimates using the cases of the airline industry as 
an example. Next, I discuss the problems associated with the so-called ‘Energy Paradox,’ 
which leads to host of further of difficulties such as direct and indirect rebound effects. 
Also reviewed in this section are the problems connected to ceteris paribus logic which 
assumes that all variables involved in economic analysis of environmental issues will 
remain unchanged – which they rarely do. 
 
 
A second set of complications associated with economic studies of the climate change 
discussed in this piece emerges out of Andrew Feenberg’s work on the environment in 
which he discusses ceteris paribus modes of analysis in detail. Ceteris paribus refers to 
…… Feenberg argues that ceteris paribus thinking, as it has been applied to the subject of 
climate in particular, fails to consider the articulation, development and implementation 
of new technical standards, which, if widely adopted, could alter current projections 
around emissions. While Feenberg’s critique shares several assumptions with the 
economic critique also discussed, it differs in that his approach highlights how changes in 
technical standards related to the environment might develop over time. 
 
In the third section, I discuss a further flaw in economic studies of climate change which 
center around the belief that there are will be no substantive cultural and/or political 
constraints on future energy use. The assumption here is that the public will not consent 
to make changes in lifestyle and consumption patterns in order to mitigate global 
warming and, consequently, geoengineering will be necessary. This conclusion is not 
inevitable. What is required, and can develop if given the needed support and space, is a 
reconfiguration of value hierarchies based on a long-term view of social and 
environmental well-being. 
 
In the final section of this chapter, a more detailed discussion of how the articulation of 
new environmental and technical standards and values can engender a transformed 
relationship with the environment is undertaken. Democratic rationalization, as discussed 
by Andrew Feenberg in his work on the philosophy of technology, is the end result of this 
process. Overall, I conclude that the oftentimes painful arguments over technological 
solutions to environmental problems, and the many possible avenues by which we might 
begin to deal with anthropocentric climate change, is a natural part of the process of 
technical evolution. 
 
Moreover, I make the case that the traditional economic arguments which support 
geoengineering may well come be widely seen as unsuitable due to the unique nature of 
climate change. Anthropocentric global warming, in this context, has to be thought of as 
a cultural issue threatening civilization, not one of economic costs and benefits. 
 
1. Geoengineering 
Geoengineering can be defined as intentional technological interventions into the world’s 
climate in order to prevent, mitigate or reverse anthropogenic global warming (Allenby, 
2010 and Long et al, 2012). Its techniques are purposeful, have far-reachingg obaleffects 
and rely on technology as its central driver. Geoengineering generally falls under one of 
two categories: first, solar radiation management (SRM) techniques, which aim to reflect 
sunlight away from the earth through such methods as enhancing cloud whitening, in 
which seawater is sprayed into the atmosphere with the aim of increasing the proportion 
of light reflecting cloud cover, and albedo enhancement, which involves covering regions 
with light reflecting white materials or pumping aerosol sulphates in the stratosphere in 
pursuit of the same objective. 
 
 
Second, CDRs (carbon dioxide removal techniques), on the other hand, aim to remove 
carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere. In one technique, called biochar, 
geoengineers would plant, burn, and bury large quantities of biomass. This method aims 
to suck in and store a large amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide during the burning 
phase.  Carbon capture and sequestration is another CDR method in which carbon is 1
physically captured and sequestered underground. This technique is currently being 
tested in the private sector. As well, ocean fertilization, wherein the ocean is seeded with 
iron with the objective of increasing the quantity of carbon absorbing algae blooms, also 
falls into the category of CDR. 
 
 
2. SPICE Project 
Currently, a concerted effort is taking place to carefully and comprehensively test the 
feasibility of SRM geoengineering in the UK through intensive modeling. The project, 
called SPICE (Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering) is a collaboration 
among  Marshall Aerospace, a European company specializing in military, civilian and 
commercial aircraft engineering, and the Universities of Cambridge, Oxford, Bristol and 
Edinburgh. The project aims to initiate the first steps towards testing the feasibility of 
injecting light reflecting particles into the stratosphere – which will then, it is believed, 
lead to global temperature cooling. Those involved in the project had, in fact, originally 
intended to physically test aspects of this geoengineering technique. However, as a result 
of strong public opposition, the testing elements of the project have been put on hold 
indefinitely. Yet SPICE remains the most legitimized, well-known and publicly discussed 
geoengineering project. As such, it serves as a useful case study – particularly with 
respect to how it has been justified in economic terms.  2
 
Basically, and consistent with SPICE’s SRM geoengineering project, researchers hope 
that the effects of dispersing sulfur dioxide particulates, or other such aerosols, into the 
lower atmosphere will reflect sunlight back into space and initiate a cooling effect (note 
that this would not, however, reduce the existing levels of atmospheric greenhouse 
gases). Over a number of weeks, the sulfur dioxide would combine with water and 
oxygen to form sulfuric acid gas and then condense into aerosol droplets creating a 
visible haze that reflects sunlight. This method of geoengineering relies on the cooling 
effects experienced after volcanic eruptions. 
 
The most studied and cited example of such an eruption is that of Mount Pinatubo in 
1991 (a major study of the Mount Pinatubo eruption in the Philippines was undertaken by 
NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies). It was concluded by NASA that the net 
effect of this volcanic eruption was that the released sulfur dioxide, over one year, led to 
a cooling effect over the Northern Hemisphere of 0.5 to 0.6 degrees (Celsius). However, 
1  ​Biochar is produced when various forms of plant matter are heated in a low oxygen 
environment. When the remaining matter (biochar) is placed in soil, it removes carbon from the 
atmosphere and stores it, thus acting as form of sequestration 
2  ​SPICE studies have also formed the basis of David Keith and James Anderson’s (both Harvard 
engineers) current plan to conduct a similar field experiment in New Mexico. 
 
it should also be noted that similar studies show that this was followed by unusually rapid 
ozone depletion rates in the Southern Hemisphere (Pinatubo Volcano Observatory Team, 
1991). 
 
The SPICE project, as stated, marks the preliminary steps towards testing whether the 
cooling experienced after Mount Pinatubo can be replicated through human intervention 
– i.e., by injecting sulfur dioxide, or other such particulates, into the atmosphere directly 
(although this test would have used water). The SPICE test, which was to have taken 
place in Norfolk, UK, was to have attached a helium filled balloon to a one kilometer 
long piece of hosepipe that is firmly tethered to the ground. Water would then be pumped 
from the ground to the top of the hosepipe and sprayed into the surrounding area. 
According to the lead researcher of the project, Dr. Matt Watson of Bristol University, 
SPICE,  that it  
 
will eventually be the first UK project aimed at providing some much-needed, 
evidence based, knowledge about geoengineering technologies. The project itself 
is not carrying out geoengineering, just investigating the feasibility of doing so. 
We hope that by carrying out this research we will start to shed light on some of 
the uncertainties surrounding this controversial subject, and encourage mature and 
wide-ranging debate that will help inform any future research and decision 
making (NERC, 2011). 
 
Moreover, this test, according to the principle investigators – who still hope to get 
permission to go ahead in the near future – aims to further two specific strands of inquiry: 
first, to test the particle candidates – that is, to consider “what would be an 'ideal' particle 
to inject into the stratosphere.” In doing so, the researchers “aim to identify a particle 
with excellent solar radiation scattering properties, and consider what potential impacts 
might be on climate, weather, ecosystems and human health” (NERC, 2011). 
Additionally, the scientists involved hope to examine the tethered balloon 
transportation/delivery system and build new modeling criteria based on the conclusions 
reached. 
 
As such, the SPICE project marks the first step towards more focused, small-scale, 
legitimate geoengineering testing. The next phase anticipatesusing a 20 kilometer long 
piece of hosepipe, although that particular test is thought to be years away. I return to the 
SPICE project and methods that have been developed to assess the test’s outcomes 
further on in this piece. 
 
In the next section, a general critique of quantitative research methods is given as they 
relate to the environment as well as a more intensive and critical assessment of 
economic-focused, cost benefit modes of analysis – particularly with respect to how they 
inform environmental issues and geoengingeering.. 
 
3. Critique of Economic Approach: Quantitative Methods  
 
 
More often than not, when studying environmental issues, research methods that are not 
exclusively quantitative are dismissed as irrelevant because they are perceived as 
subjective, unscientific, non-cumulative and non-generalizable. Quantitative ‘scientific’ 
and empirical data, in contrast, is seen as “unproblematically available to observation free 
from any prior theoretical commitments” (Demeritt, 2006, 455). I, however, am in good 
company in arguing that there is much more to the study of social, natural and 
environmental phenomena than a simple number and discrete sets of data (Van den 
Bergh, Jeroen, 2004; Creswell, Lark, 2007). More qualitative modes of analysis must be 
incorporated into studies of climate change and environmental degradation. The IPCC 
has taken steps to do so through the incorporation of socio-economic issues – for example 
in their2014 report,  which studies issues of food security, poverty, risks and sustainable 
development. 
 
Qualitative methods, on the other hand, tend to focus more intently on experiences, 
cultures, understandings and interactions. As Berg argues, “Quality refers to the what, 
how, when, and where of a thing – its essence and ambience. Qualitative research thus 
refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and 
descriptions of things” (Berg, 2007, 3). An over-reliance on quantitative methods is 
problematic in that they are underpinned by a realist, positivist epistemology which 
assumes that there exist objective facts in the world that can be known through specific 
kinds of scientifically derived and experiment-based research. Overall, using the 
scientific method (and attendant techniques of observation and deduction) to study the 
natural and social world is supposed toremove the uncertain and often muddled factors of 
values, ideology and politics. 
 
Those skeptical of this perspective, many of whom fall into the category of social 
constructivists, contend that this is not the case and assert that knowledge about the world 
is actively constructed. Of particular importance to the subject of geoengineering and 
climate change, is the predictive bias of most quantitative methodologies, which draw on 
statistical analysis in ways that tend to endow the analyses with an aura of certainty. 
Quantitative methods also assume a certain predictive and controlling faculty that is far 
from certain when it comes to the unpredictable side-effects of geoengineering, which 
can range from acid rain to flooding and even drought. 
 
4. Critique of Economic Studies of Environmental Issues: A General Assessment 
 
Moving from this general critique of quantitative methods to the more specific critique of 
the kinds of economic analysis associated with environmental impact assessments, it is 
critical to begin by unpacking the assumptions and biases that permeate analyses of this 
sort. First, it is often the case that traditional environmental economics, as they relate to 
subjects like sustainability and risk, tend to ignore non-market values such as the 
“individual’s willingness to pay for preserving a particular resource for future use, 
[and]…the individuals’ willingness to pay for preserving a particular resource for the 
sake of its existence” (Venkatachalam, 2004, 90; see Straton, 2006 & Boyd, 2007). 
 
 
Even aspects like the public’s willingness to accept environmental risk, which is factored 
into some more recent cost-benefit studies of environmental policy and technology, 
reflect a bias towards retaining the environmental status quo when it comes to measures 
that might upset our current way of life. As such, with respect to the subject of 
geoengineering, it is often assumed that preserving our current economic and 
socio-political system is of the greatest importance to individuals. Supporters of 
geoengineering who rely on this assumption often hold an implicit, or even explicit, 
conservative bias in that they assume ​a priori ​  resistance to fundamental change. An 
example of this can be found in the work of Gregory Benford, who, in an essay written 
for the conservative Reason Foundation in 1997, argues that 
 
Instead of draconian cutbacks in greenhouse-gas emissions, there may very well 
be fairly simple ways–even easy ones–to fix our dilemma. …take seriously the 
concept of “geoengineering,” of consciously altering atmospheric chemistry and 
conditions, of mitigating the effects of greenhouse gases rather than simply 
calling for their reduction or outright prohibition (Benford, 1997). 
 
This ethos persists today and is reiterated by groups like the American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI) as well as governments and individual scientists like Kerry Emanuel of 
MIT and David Keith, formerly at the University of Calgary and now at Harvard.  3
 
Second, it should be noted that much of the disparity between econometric analyses of 
environmental goods and more socially resonant ones comes down to the way questions 
about environmental measures are articulated and framed: 
 
Take for instance, a proposed change in an environmental policy that 
would resultin an improved air quality in a particular locality. Ceteris paribus 
(such asproperty rights, etc.), an individual in the locality can either be asked to 
state her maximum willingness to pay (compensating variation) for ensuring 
the change in the policy that aims at say, improving the air quality in the region 
or she can be asked to state minimum willingness to accept compensation 
(equivalent variation) required to compensate the expected utility foregone due to 
nonimplementation of the proposed policy. (Venkatachalam, 2004, 92) 
 
With respect to geoengineering, much of the concern around risk, using economic 
analysis, has centered on how the calculation of the public’s willingness to accept 
compensation is made and how much compensation they would require to accept the 
possible fallout. This comes to replace more important questions like the public’s 
willingness to make concrete changes to their lives in order to address the root causes of 
climate change – rather than relying on a technological quick-fix that may backfire. It 
also, as Charleswroth and Okereke (2010) argue, undermines the ability for people to 
make decisions about risk – particularly when they are not given the information needed 
3  ​Note that Keith is more reluctant than AEI or Emanuel in his support of geoengineering, 
preferring to pose it as a unfortunate but necessary alternative that must be studied.  
 
to do so. 
 
5. Critique of Specific Economic Methods 
 
In the following sections, I give three further reasons why economic analyses, when 
applied to the study of the environment and geoengineering, have serious limitations. 
Such concerns center on problematic demand estimates, the so-called ‘Energy Paradox,’ 
as well as an over-reliance on flawed ceteris paribus logic. The conclusion reached 
through an examination of these methods not only points to and supports opponents of 
geoengineering, but also describes the limits of focusing solely on technological solutions 
to climate change – even with respect to ​specific ​ energy efficient technologies (even 
though they are desperately needed) – since these do not address the central problems of 
an overconsumptive and resource-based economic system. 
 
5.1 Demand Estimates 
 
First, with respect to demand estimates, it is the case that many of the projections used to 
support the need for geoengineering rely on estimations of energy demands that do not 
consider possible changes in lifestyle and consumption patterns, or even technological 
changes made with public input, that might put us on a more sustainable path. These 
estimates draw on equations that assume the present patterns of emissions, consumption 
and demand will continue to rise. It is important to note, however, that statistics related to 
future energy use are based upon past consumption patterns and are therefore considered 
by most economists to be probabilities that can be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
However, I argue that proponents of geoengineering have politicized and transformed 
these probabilities into projections to support geoengineering. 
 
For example, according to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) research in this area, 
at present, the following statistics most accurately captures expectations related to future 
energy use: 
 
Transport accounts for about one quarter of global energy use and energy-related 
CO2 emissions. In absence of new policies, transport energy use and related CO2 
emissions are projected to increase by nearly 50% by 2030 and by more than 
80%by 2050. Nearly 70% of electricity is generated from fossil fuels: coal (42% 
of generated power globally in 2007); gas (21%); hydro (16%); nuclear (14%); oil 
(6%); and non-hydro-renewables (2%). As a result, electricity accounts for 40% 
of global energy-related CO2 emissions; these emissions will grow by 58% 
globally by 2030 unless new policy measures are introduced. Industry accounts 
for approximately one-third of global final energy use and almost 40% of total 
energy-related CO2 emissions. Over recent decades, industrial energy efficiency 
has improved and CO2 intensity declined in many sectors, but this progress has 
been offset by growing industrial production worldwide. Projections of future 
energy use and emissions show that without decisive action, these trends will 
continue (IEA, 2011). 
 
 
What is striking about these statistics is not how dire they are, but rather, that because 
they rely entirely on the assumption that consumption patterns will inevitably increase, 
their assessment of demand estimates has opened the door for some groups to seize on 
this sense of futility in order to push for drastic forms of technological mitigation like 
geoengineering. 
 
Some evidence, for example data collected by the global energy intelligence firm 
Enerdata, suggests world energy demand is actually decreasing for the first time in thirty 
years (Enerdata, 2010). Note that while the assumption of increasing energy demand and 
its consequences are not false or faulty, as these figures are often used to support the call 
for sustainability as well, what is problematic is that proponents of geoengineering have 
taken to using them to support their case for immediate technological intervention.  By 4
(1) assuming that demand, use, and supply will remain stable (ceteris paribus), (2) failing 
to define the role and drawbacks of extrapolations, which tend to use aggregate data and 
assume that past trends will predict the future, and (3) by conflating extrapolations with 
projections, the latter of which assume that certain future conditions will hold based on a 
set of assumptions about the present, this data then feeds into a kind of groupthink on the 
inevitable need for geoengineering that does little justice to its complexity or 
tenuousness. 
 
Scientists like Nobel Prize Winner Paul Crutzen and Ken Caldeira of Carnegie Mellon 
and MIT’s David Battisti have all formulated public justifications of geoengineering 
based on the view that significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions will not occur 
and that technologies that will substantively reduce climate change will likely not be 
conceived of or produced in the near future. In fact, these numbers have functioned as 
compelling arguments to justify projects like SPICE. Specifically, it has been argued that 
the SPICE experiment is necessary because of the rapid rate of anthropogenic climate 
change and a firm belief that consumption patterns will continue to rise unabated. 
According to the SPICE project’s initial grant proposal to the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), it claimed that: 
 
Future projections by climate models indicate substantial changes in future 
decades, much of which is on a regional scale that will severely impact regions of 
the world that are already under stress. There has been much improved 
understanding of the serious nature of the global warming problem both by 
politicians and the general public in recent years. However, there is great concern 
that efforts to mitigate future change by reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, including the outcome of the international meeting in Copenhagen 
2009, are proceeding too slowly to avoid the risk of dangerous climate change and 
the possibility of certain 'tipping points' (such as the collapse of the Indian 
Monsoon of melting of the Arctic ice sheet) being reached. This has prompted 
4  ​Nor, in this context, does it matter whether these projections are true or false. What matters is 
how these estimates are taken up without proper explanation and contextualization. 
 
consideration of intervention by alternative means. (Watson, 2010) 
 
Ironically, several private and politically conservative think tanks also hold this view. For 
instance, in the concluding statement from the Climate Institute’s Asilomar on Climate 
Intervention Technologies, in which many noted scientists took part, it was asserted that: 
“Despite ongoing efforts to reduce emissions and adapt to the changing climate, global 
greenhouse gas emissions are far above what is required to reverse the increasing changes 
in atmospheric composition” (Climate Institute, 2, 2010). Again, while this conclusion is 
based on sound science, its basic assumption is that nothing behavioral, or even 
technological (in terms of energy efficient technologies), will occur to change these 
figures. 
 
In what follows, I apply the critique of demand estimates to the study of the fuel 
efficiency in the airline industry. This case offers a concrete illustration of the problems 
with the conclusions reached using demand estimates based solely on past behavior. 
Similar conclusions can be extrapolated and applied to the case of geoengineering. 
 
5.2 The Airline Industry  
 
An example of an industry in which problematic demand estimates have been relied upon 
is that of fuel efficiencies related to the airline industry. When evaluated in light of 
geoengineering, what becomes clear is that (1) energy efficient technologies need to be 
assessed and studied using more flexible criteria; and (2)even with the wide 
implementation of energy saving technology and regulation (as they exist now), climate 
warming will likely continue. 
 
With respect to the airline industry, in its 2011 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) report, the IPCC makes it clear that the current methods used to assess 
the environmental concerns of the aviation industry (which are then used to guide public 
policy on efficiency targets and emissions limits) are highly problematic. The report 
criticizes the overuse of cost-benefit analysis which tends to conclude that demand for 
airline travel will inevitably fall as a result of efficiency targets due to higher costs – 
which are passed on to consumers – thereby harming the airline sector in particular and 
the global economy in general. This thesis, however, fails to consider the fact that 
“airlines operate in a highly competitive environment, and in the short term many may 
absorb fare increases at a cost to profitability rather than pass them on to passengers” 
(IPCCa, 2011). The neglect of factors such as this is rife in economic-focused studies of 
technologies like geoengineering as well. 
 
These estimates also, the IPCC maintains, do not explain the fact that: (1) a good deal of 
the data in sectors like the airline industry is protected by industry/commercial 
confidentiality and therefore are not factored into current studies; (2) forecasts require a 
long appraisal period to adequately calculate the benefits of emissions reductions; (3) 
scientific uncertainties regarding the impact of emissions leads to the use of estimated 
pollution reductions as the only measure of benefits; and (4) uncertainties about future 
 
trends in technology, which may be much more efficient and safe, are rarely considered 
(IPCCa, 2011). 
 
As stated, many of the pitfalls of economic analysis discussed with respect to the airline 
industry apply to geoengineering studies as well. Some of these problems can be seen in 
to the SPICE project’s public consultation process. While its final report, titled ‘Public 
Engagement on Geoengineering Research: Preliminary Report on the SPICE Deliberative 
Workshops,’ offers a nuanced and open discussion of the SPICE project’s objectives, 
methods, consequences, and the public’s concerns, its basic assumptions ignore the 
possibility that new, more democratic technologies might be developed or that 
consumption patterns might fundamentally change. It assumes, as such, that 
environmental conditions will remain as they are. These shortcomings persist despite the 
fact that this particular consultative process drew on a qualitative research process, 
namely the focus group. 
 
Philosopher Andrew Feenberg terms this kind of logic consistent with ceteris paribus 
reasoning, which assumes that all factors considered in these kinds of analysis will 
remain constant – including demand. While ceteris paribus assumptions simplify 
complex economic data, they also constrain and leave out a large number of important 
variables and, in doing so, often lead to projections that are divorced from reality. An 
example of this is the Law of Demand, which asserts that “quantity demanded depends 
negatively on price ceteris paribus.” However, while it is widely acknowledged that this 
is a “very useful and convenient theory,” it only works as long as the “ceteris paribus 
assumption is not ignored.” We also have to also consider, as Bierens and Swanson 
argue, “that complements as well as substitutes exist for most traded goods” (Bierens and 
Swanson, 1998, 4). A wider account and critique of ceteris paribus logic is given below. 
 
 
5.3 The “Energy Paradox” 
 
A second misuse of economic logic based on these assumptions leads to what is called 
the “Energy Paradox” which is comprised of two interconnected theses. First, is the 
misperception that it is the consumers themselves who apply unreasonable hurdles to 
impede investment in energy saving technologies. This part of the paradox claims that it 
is the consumer’s inflated monetary expectations, and their frustration when these 
expectations do not materialize, that leads to objections when the next generation of 
efficient technologies are made available. 
 
This assumption, however, fails to account for the consumer factoring in the high future 
monetary and social costs of increased energy consumption, which are often not made 
clear or concrete. For this to be rectified, what would be required is that: one, clear 
information be made available to consumers about potential costs and savings in the long 
term; two, that nonrational behavioral factors and choices be  considered (such resource 
and time constraints as well as the tendency to be “biased toward the status quo,” overall 
risk aversion, and an increased willingness to “take risks to avoid losses than to achieve 
 
gains in making economic decisions”) (Pew Center, 2011); and three, that carbon 
emissions themselves be priced so that decisions about energy use and efficiency are 
placed in a social, rather than just a personal or individual, context. 
 
The second and most intractable part of this so-called Energy Paradox asserts that energy 
efficient technologies often create a rebound effect whereby moves towards energy 
efficiency, like in the case of improved housing insulation as well as energy efficient 
cars, appliances, and planes, do not lead to a decrease in consumption but an ​increase ​ due 
to a decline in the cost of operating the utility (i.e., heating) or appliance. This is known 
as a direct rebound effect and can also include cases in which companies take their profits 
from investment in energy efficient technologies and use it to expand the company in 
ways that not only increase output, but also emissions. 
 
Indirect rebound effects, on the other hand, include cases in which, for example, families 
who save money on energy efficient appliances then use the saved money to engage in 
activities that leave a significant carbon footprint (like take a vacation which involves 
plane travel). It should be noted, however, that this can also occur in circumstances apart 
from choices made about purchasing energy efficient technologies when, for example, 
individuals who save money by buying solar panels uses the saved money to purchase 
something that is emissions intensive and produces waste, like a newer TV. 
 
Yet, as in most cases in which economic-based analyses are chosen to evaluate complex 
human behavior, there exists a further often overlooked set of problems related to 
rebound effects. To begin with, there is competing data on the precise levels of rebound 
effects, which suggests that they are limits to its applicability to such things as water use, 
larger appliances, and heating (Greening, Green and Difiglio, 2000). Even the less than 
progressive Breakthrough Institute, a think tank which recently compiled a 
comprehensive literature review of data on rebound effects, argues that the highest levels 
of rebound occurs "not at the consumer level but in the productive sectors of the economy 
(industry and commerce). Improving the efficiency of a steel plant may result in lower 
cost of steel, greater demand for steel, and also create greater economic growth – all of 
which will drive significant rebound in energy use following efficiency improvements” 
(The Breakthrough Institute, 2011).   5
 
The UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) reached similar findings in a 2007 report 
titled, ‘The Rebound Effect: An Assessment of the Evidence for Economy- 
Wide Energy Savings from Improved Energy Efficiency.’ In it, the authors provide a 
comprehensive assessment of statistics related to perceived rebound effects by comparing 
a future scenario in which the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) efficiency 
5  ​Many scientists (Evan Mills at Berkeley’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and Jim 
Sweeny of 
Stanford) have come out against the Breakthrough Institute’s assertions with respect to the 
rebound effects 
of corporations, which they argue, are based on faulty research. 
 
recommendations were adopted with one in which they were not.  One of the report’s 6
most significant conclusions is that when applied to the household energy use, investment 
in energy efficient technologies can in fact save a significant amount of energy – 
particularly when coupled with taxation and regulation. The Research Centre report also 
finds that direct rebound effects are likely to “decline in the future as demand saturates. 
Improvements in energy efficiency should therefore achieve 70% or more of the 
reduction in energy consumption using engineering principles” (UKERC, vi). ​ ​Factors 7
such as the short time span of studies and the lack of consideration of developing nations’ 
energy use in this context pose similar limitations. 
 
Applied to the case of geoengineering, the rebound effect argument has been taken to 
support the thesis that because increased energy efficiency will not significantly alter 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions, geoengineering will become necessary. As such, any 
evidence that suggests that consumption will increase, despite competing data that 
indicates this is does not have to be the case, has be used to support further testing and 
research. Physicist David Keith, in a recent interview with ​Scientific America​ , makes this 
very argument. He states that because the “The Arctic is melting faster than people 
expected,” and since not much has been done to counteract this, that 
geoengineering will have to be adopted (Biello, 2011). 
 
However, it is equally important to acknowledge that evidence supporting the thesis that 
energy efficient technologies will not solve the climate problem can be interpreted in 
another way: i.e. to suggest that ​existing ​ energy efficient technologies can only do so 
much, that more open and publically initiated discussion of new technologies is required, 
and that fundamental political and economic change is necessary. Accompanying this line 
of thought, a case can also be made for the argument that an overreliance on 
technological solutions like geoengineering will likely fail to solve the underlying 
problem: our extractive and consumption-based economic system. 
 
5.4 Ceteris Paribus 
The third and final economic argument that has been used to undermine less invasive 
technological solutions to climate change is an overreliance on ceteris paribus logic. It is 
significant, with respect to the ceteris paribus projections and the supportive conclusions 
derived thereof, that this mode of reasoning has been consistently drawn on to support 
both SRM and CDR geoengineering. This is particularly evident with respect to 
discussions taking place at the levels of governance and public policy such at the Royal 
Society (2009) and the US House Committee on Science and Technology (2010). Both of 
these bodies have reached conclusions that support the ​possible ​ need for geoengineering 
based on statistics relating to future energy use and have agreed to work together on 
6  ​The Research Councils UK, which have a rich history of funding research, funds the UKERC 
through 
public monies and block grants (the councils also fund other research groups inside and outside 
the 
scientific, technological and environmental domain). 
7  ​This does not, however, account for indirect rebound effects, which might limit this reduction. 
 
geoengineering issues.  
 
Since 2009, both bodies have undertaken research on international decision-making, 
governance of geoengineering research and deployment, as well as one the science, price 
and environmental impacts of these technologies. While research in this area continues, 
even when based upon the most lukewarm support for further study, it is most often 
based upon the assumption that everything will remain ceteris paribus. Geoengineering’s 
advocates have then taken this up not as evidence of the need for immediate changes to 
rates of energy consumption and economic formations, as many in the scientific 
community contend, but to support geoengineering as a viable alternative to more 
traditional mitigation strategies. It recently came to light that Russia asked the IPCC to 
include a discussion of geoengineering in its 2013 report – particularly in light of the dire 
ceteris paribus based projections coming out of the IPCC. Russia has also publicly 
acknowledged that it is conducting its own geoengineering research.  
 
The 2013 IPCC report itself, in a box marked TS.7, provides an overview of 
geoengineering and highlights the unknowns of both SRM and CDR methods. While 
both critical and skeptical of both approaches, the report also suggest that, ceteris paribus, 
“Modelling indicates that SRM methods, if realizable, have the potential to substantially 
offset global temperature rise…”(IPCCb, 21) . Critics have highlighted that the inclusion 
of TS.7 serves to legitimate geoengineering and this tepid statement, which is followed 
by several caveats, gives backing to its proponents.  
 
In closing this section, it is important to note that the use of quantitative methods to 
assess environmental issues and technologies, like climate change and geoengineering, 
also tends to influence ethical analyses. Most ethical examination of geoengineering 
draws on a consequentialist ethical framework that reduces normative considerations to 
how economic effects are distributed (Jameson and Elliot, 2009). In this way, even the 
atmosphere comes to be seen as property (i.e. a scare resource) subject to our use. This 
kind of instrumental logic relies on a drive for human mastery over nature which, 
philosophers of technology like Andrew Feenberg argues, negates human reason and 
autonomy and endangers human survival. 
 
6 Feenberg’s Philosophy of Technology Approach 
Feenberg’s approach to environmental issues rooted in a critical philosophy of 
technology builds on these arguments and makes the case that calculations of efficiency 
and cost-benefit analysis, with respect to the adoption of technologies, fails to account for 
the complex social and cultural forces that guide technological change. What makes 
Feenberg’s approach distinct from other critiques of economic-centric studies of climate 
and climate technologies is that it is rooted in a conception of technical rationality and 
founded on the need for futher democratization. 
 
Briefly, Feenberg views technology as an inherently social artifact that is replete with 
meanings that are not entirely “inscribed into the nature of the technology” itself 
(Feenberg, 2010, 15). As such, he contends that technical choices can be made which 
 
reflect socially resonant and ecologically sensitive cultural values and meanings rather 
than standards of abstract control, efficiency and economic power. This was the case with 
the Internet which, rather than serving as a mere portal to access to information or for the 
purposes of emergency communication as was intended, became a nexus of social 
networks and interaction. In this context, democratic rationalization, Feenberg argues, 
can be understood as the process by which the controversies that surround technology are 
funneled into the production of innovative solutions that do not reflect power, money or 
abstract rationality but “a struggle to subvert the technical practices, procedure and 
designs structuring everyday life” (Feenberg, 2010, 27). 
 
In line with this approach, Feenberg, in a piece titled ‘Incommensurable Paradigms: 
Values and the Environment,’ from his book ​Between Reason and Experience​ , draws on 
this critical framework to claim that we must reject measures of technical rationality that 
are defined in purely economic terms since these kinds of calculations hold economic 
boundaries to be invariant. Historically, however, it is clear that precisely what should be 
subject to economic assessment are the changing nature of these very boundaries. In this 
sense, it could be argued that the current controversy surrounding geoengineering is in 
fact part of the natural evolution of technical norms and boundaries which could, at some 
point, place environmental issues in the realm of social, rather than economic, interests. I 
return to this point further on. 
 
One of Feenberg’s central arguments against the sole use of economic analyses of 
environmental issues lies in this conception of boundaries wherein the environment is 
forcibly placed within the boundary/sphere/purview of the economy where it does not 
necessarily fit and where solutions like geoengineering become common sense or, as 
Feenberg puts it, certain technical solutions “rigidifies into destiny” (Feenberg, 1999, 14). 
Feenberg also, in doing so, concludes is that it is impossible to “place monetary value on 
such things as natural beauty and good health because, but these values have been 
translated into monetary terms to enter the calculation. Trade-off arguments are thus 
often based on flimsy estimates of costs and benefits when they are not ideological 
expressions of hidden interests” (Feenberg, 2010, 33-34). This applies directly to the case 
of geoengineering as well. 
 
Moreover, according to this constructivist approach, which incorporates a clear account 
of democracy and participation, environmental values can and should be “incorporated 
into technically disciplines and codes” such that environmentalism is accepted as “a self 
evident advance” (Feenberg, 2010, 43). This conception of democratic rationalization and 
its application to environmentalism and technology is critical in that it provides a clear 
standard by which to assess geoengineering and formulate new goals. Economically 
based models of analysis, as demonstrated, do not allow for this because the economy has 
a boundary and cannot account for the social values needed to think about the use of 
technologies like geoengineering or even issues around food safety, rainforest protection 
or nuclear energy. Moreover, this theory of rationalization, particularly with respect to 
the formulation of new objectives and knowledge – and when coupled with Feenberg’s 
considered rejection of cost-benefit analysis, offers a corrective to traditional way new 
 
technologies have been studies. 
 
Turning back to geoengineering, it is significant that the majority of studies, 
commentaries and justifications of its further research and potential use rely on precisely 
the kinds of economic assessments Feenberg criticizes. A significant example of this is 
the work of the Copenhagen Consensus Center (CCC) –  a policy think thank funded by 
the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – which aims at developing studies of the worlds’ 
major challenges using the expertise of preeminent economists. As a result, all of the 
group’s major studies employ traditional and rather conservative economic approaches. 
In their most recent study of climate change mitigation, 24 papers were commissioned 
from climate economists to answer the following question: 
 
If the global community wants to spend up to, say $250 billion per year over the 
next 10 years to diminish the adverse effects of climate changes, and to do most 
good for the world, which solutions would yield the greatest net benefits? – i.e. 
what are the costs and benefits of different viable climate interventions…given 
some reasonable assumptions about sensible policies for the rest of 21st century? 
(CCC, 2009). 
 
In a widely cited and highly ranked paper submitted to the CCC for this project, under the 
aegis of the American Enterprise Institute, J.E. Bickel and Lee Lane make the case for 
geoengineering in line with the CCC’s call for a purely economic, cost-benefit approach. 
Their conclusion is as follows: 
 
We estimate that the benefit of a single watt of SRM is worth over $6 trillion 
under an emissions control regime of optimal abatement. Furthermore, we show 
that a single watt of SRM has the same economic benefit as capturing and 
sequestering almost 65% of yearly CO2 emissions, which, in conjunction with 
AC’s significant costs, argues in favor of SRM in the near term (Bickel and Lane, 
2009, 3). 
 
Most of Bickel and Lane’s study stresses the significance of quantitative benefits, cost 
estimates, transaction costs and political market failures. For example, their list of 
potential ‘costs’ of deploying climate engineering technologies include the costs of 
resources to develop, deploy and fund the technology, potential costs of conflict, and 
monitoring costs. Even their study of politics remains focused on potential transaction 
costs – particularly with respect to the potential for “political structures and rules…[to] 
sometimes block or distort the choice of the best response to a problem” (Bickel and 
Lane, 2009, 26). They suggest that stratospheric aerosol injections, of the SPICE project 
kind, have a very attractive benefit-cost ratio, which should warrant further testing. 
This mode of analysis, according to Feenberg’s framework, poses a significant boundary 
problem since it ought to be the case that the logic of trade-offs, with respect to the 
climate, be considered irrelevant because of the unique status of the environment. Not 
only are decisions regarding the natural environment intrinsically connected to moral 
questions about the kind of world we want to live in, and thus not reducible to economic 
 
calculations, but they also cannot be reduced to ​ceteris paribus​  logic. 
 
Ceteris partibus​  logic, as Feenberg makes clear, draws on technological determinism and 
a neutral conception of technology that have “long since been superseded by more 
sophisticated approaches” (Feenberg, 2010, 34). When applied to the geoengineering 
debate, technological determinism, and related assumptions about the neutrality of 
technology, serves to minimize the socially constructed nature of these technologies 
whose design and development are a result of social choices which could have gone a 
number of ways. Also ignored is geoengineering’s tendency towards incorporating 
techno-centric, control-oriented and instrumental technical values at its core. 
 
Therefore, by confining the economic measure of trade-offs when studying technology, a 
more sophisticated notion of historical change can emerge (i.e. one that is not static and 
therefore resistant to purely economic analyses). This is in addition to the realization that 
boundaries between what is subject to and what lies outside economic analyses shift with 
time and, as such, some things, like the environment, should not be subject solely to 
economic calculations. Yet many of the potential side effects of geoengineering still 
continue to be quantified primarily in economic terms by scientific bodies, think tanks 
and governments.  
 
For example, in the Royal Society’s 2009 report on geoengineering, titled 
‘Geoengineering the Climate: Science Governance and Uncertainty,” the Society draws 
on the four primary categories of effectiveness, affordability, timeliness and safety to 
evaluate geoengineering technologies. Their method of reaching conclusions with respect 
to the possible deployment of these techniques is to assign the parameters of very high, 
high, low and very low to these four categories. The Society describe these respective 
groupings as relatively static ‘technological criteria’ that are distinct from aspects like 
“public attitudes, social acceptability, political feasibility and legality which may change 
over time” (Royal Society, 2009, 7). What the Society fails to note, however, is that 
technological norms and decisions are also subject to change and often these decisions 
have unintended consequences. 
 
It is noteworthy that the criteria employed to evaluate geoengineering in this report, 
specifically with respect to so-called ‘technological’ factors, places each of these 
categories on a relatively equal footing. As such, even with respect to safety, which could 
be interpreted in relation to the social good and collective risk and thus placed above 
other factors, is played off against the criteria of cost and effectiveness. In this sense, if a 
geoengineering technique is seen to be highly effective and low in cost with medium risk 
to safety, its use could be justified. 
 
This kind of reasoning is deployed in other areas of the Royal Society’s report as well. 
For instance, according to the study, ocean fertilization techniques are deemed to be 
acceptable because, while they receive a safety ranking of very low, they rank high in 
other categories. Yet this fertilization approach is not only unlikely to be effective in 
removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere over the long term, but could also lead to 
 
an increase in so-called oceanic ‘dead-zones,’ increased acidification of the deep ocean 
and conflicts over food security if the phosphorus used for such purposes rises in cost 
(phosphorus is required for agricultural production). 
 
Cloud seeding is another approach that, while potentially effective in reducing carbon 
dioxide levels, could affect weather patterns in countries already suffering from 
unpredictable changes (e.g. by leading to increased precipitation in India and 
Bangladesh). According to the Royal Society’s own report, stratospheric seeding could 
negatively affect biological productivity and have adverse affects on the hydrological 
cycle, on the ozone and on high altitude cloud production. 
 
Yet despite these troubling consequences, overall, the Royal Society, reaches surprising 
conclusions about geoengineering in general and CDR techniques in particular. In fact, 
they go as far as to argue that some CDR techniques are “safe, effective, sustainable and 
affordable” (Royal Society, 2009, xi) and should therefore be studied further. It is 
troubling that this monetized, trade-off approach forms the basis of most assessments of 
geoengineering since they fail, as much of this report does, to reflect the fact that “effects 
on social wealth [that are]…significant to policy…must be measured with respect to 
fulfillment of actual desires, not theoretical constructions” (Feenberg, 2010, 44) like 
affordability, timeliness, safety etc. It is also worth noting that these approaches are 
normative and deeply undemocratic as they seek to impose a specific kind of ethical 
framework not shared by those likely to be affected.  
 
As described in the next section, and by drawing on the case of steamboat boilers and 
child labor, Feenberg illustrates ability of a critical philosophy of technology to reveal the 
absurdity of limiting our judgment of regulation and technology to static and 
deterministic economics, rather than environmental, cultural and political criteria. 
 
7. New Social and Technical Criteria 
During the early nineteenth century in the United States ticket sales for travel on 
steamboats consistently rose despite a rising death toll, which resulted from problems 
with dangerous boilers. According to Feenberg, if a purely cost-benefit analysis is 
employed to this case, there would be no need to increase regulation on boilers since it 
would appear that passengers have consented to take on the risk in exchange for low 
ticket prices – which was an argument widely held in debates over regulation at the 
federal level. However, in the end, the U.S. government unilaterally decided to regulate 
boilers and, in doing so, “prioritized the prevention of accidents” (Feenberg, 2010, 41) 
over economic factors like profit. 
 
Feenberg, makes precisely this point in relation to child labor as well, the regulation of 
which, early on, was objected to because of its potential economic cost. That is, the case 
was made that the abolition of child labor would have “catastrophic economic 
consequences – increased poverty, unemployment, loss of international competitiveness – 
from the substitution of more costly adult labor” as well as from “the depreciation cycle 
of machinery [which would have to be replaced in order to accommodate adult 
 
workers]…lower wages and trade problems” (Feenberg, 2010, 12). 
 
Yet when child labor was abolished, none of these nightmare scenarios came to fruition 
and, as a result, child labor became seen as incompatible with the values of society. In 
addition, the concerns about changes to industrial machinery needed for this 
transformation in labor practices also came to be understood as both necessary and just. 
Understood in this way, it becomes clear that the social redefinition of technical values 
and standards, as well as of human progress and development, is possible. 
 
Therefore, when applied to geoengineering and climate change, as in the previous two 
cases, what becomes essential is need for active support of the formulation of new 
technical standards and human values that are not based on personal consumption, but on 
the welfare and health of future generations. Thus at some point, like in the case of child 
labor, new, more just environmental standards could be articulated, accepted, and 
normalized in such a way that they no are longer contested and, as a result, take on the air 
of commonsense – much like it now appears ridiculous and callous to suggest that 
arguments in support of child labor based on its economic benefit could carry any weight. 
 
Overall, Feenberg, using his philosophy of technology perspective, draws on these 
examples to demonstrate how social goals are nested in competing and changing 
hierarchies that are open to interpretation. Following this argument, it is clear that such 
social goals as national unity, collective safety and the social good must be considered in 
decisions related to geoengineering as well. Yet it remains the case that an overwhelming 
number of contemporary studies on geoengineering and climate change tend to ignore 
this necessity. For instance, it is significant that the overriding assumption of the Royal 
Society’s report on geoengineering is founded on an overt rejection of the possibility that 
energy intensive technologies themselves could, through a concerted effort, be made 
redundant in the near future. While the report’s authors do emphasize the need to increase 
efforts aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions in line with the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) criteria (at least 50% on 1990 
levels by 2050), the report is clear that present efforts at reaching this goal are failing and, 
therefore, because “there is no credible emissions scenario under which global mean 
temperature would peak and then start to decline by 2100…Unless future efforts to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions are much more successful then they have been so far, 
additional action [geoengineering] may be required should it become necessary to cool 
the Earth this century” (Royal Society, 2009, ix). 
 
What is even more perplexing is that even those opposed to geoengineering tend to use 
economic logic in their rejection of these radical technologies. For example, in recent 
meeting of the Ecological Society of America, consensus was reached amongst 
prominent scientists (both natural and social) that the risks of geoengineering far 
outweigh its benefits. Robert Jackson, key organizer of the meeting and the director of 
Duke University’s Center on Global Change, makes the case that there are too many 
unknown factors for geoengineering to be considered a viable option, particularly since 
“The bigger the scale of the approach, the riskier it is for the environment” (ESA Press 
 
Release, 2009). Very little is said about the articulation of new values and, by extension, 
new technical codes. 
 
These flaws with economic-centric arguments make it even easier to avoid the difficult 
decisions required to change our present resource-intensive and environmentally 
exploitative patterns of production and consumption. Feenberg asserts that much of the 
lack of social and institutional drive to make changes are a result of the fact that “our 
civilization” such that it is, “was built by people indifferent to the environment” and, 
therefore, “Environmental considerations were not included in earlier technical 
disciplines and codes” (Feenberg, 2010, 43). This indifference to environmental values, 
when added to the levels of comfort many of us enjoy in the West, not only explains why 
there is a kind of inertia in making changes that might upset this comfort, but also why, 
as Feenberg explains, it is so difficult to impose environmental regulations on industry. 
Even the Royal Society, as noted, focus their evaluation of various geoengineering 
techniques on the vectors of effectiveness, affordability, timeliness and safety – giving 
equal weight to each. 
 
However, Feenberg also makes it clear that while, at present, environmental values are 
seen as extraneous to and even alien to the current norms guiding technological 
innovations like geoengineering, it remains possible that, like in the case of train boilers 
and child labor, such values as respect for nature and care for the environment could be 
seen “as a self-evident advance” (Feenberg, 2010, 43) in the near future. What is 
required, therefore, is that the new crop of energy efficient technologies be founded on 
technical codes that address the socially and politically grounded problems that gave rise 
to climate change, while also addressing the values upon which our society is organized. 
Which is to say that if energy efficient technologies are, one, still technocratically 
inclined, control-oriented (Franklin, 1992), authoritarian (Mumford, 1964) and 
rationalized by traditional economic analysis, very little will change. This is particularly 
the case since these instrumental values have solidified into technologies that are 
inflexible and undemocratic. While it is the case that central control is sometimes 
necessary, as in the case of water, sewage and energy systems, it is the ability to integrate 
public input into technical decision-making in a democratic way that is sorely lacking. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Overall, what is needed in our struggle against anthropogenic climate change is a firm 
rejection of technologies like geoengineering that perpetuate rationalizations and 
technical codes that are instrumentally oriented and, therefore, unable to address pressing 
ecological, political and socio-cultural needs. Supporting this tendency is a 
preponderance of contemporary economic analyses of climate change and 
geoengineering that rely on the politicization of demand estimates, ceteris paribus logic 
and cost-benefit analysis, which are then used to reach conclusions in support of risky 
technologies. These methods, I argue, must also change since they not only fail to reflect 
the changing nature of social life, but also supply a kind of permission to avoid making 
difficult choices. 
 
 
In response, as Feenberg and others who subscribe to the philosophy of technology 
approach argue, what is needed is the articulation of new technical standards and codes 
based on values that will usher in a technical paradigm that reflects democratic choice. 
Geoengineering, because it very telos is based on technocratic and instrumental codes, 
does not fall into this category. This complex, yet far more difficult, tactic would require 
us to instigate an entire re-think of our approach to the natural environment, technological 
growth and development. These new democratic technical codes, according to Feenberg, 
will then emerge through a process of technical evolution via considered debate, 
discourse, protests and legal challenges that have accompanied changes to technology 
and policy in the past. 
 
To conclude, it must be noted while this transformation will definitely entail the use of 
renewable energy and new technologies, it cannot be limited solely to this. James 
Lovelock makes this clear in a 2010 interview with the BBC in which he states that while 
renewable energy might make good business sense, it remains to be proven whether they 
can solve global warming. Bill McKibbon makes a similar case with respect to renewable 
technologies and calls for a hefty tax to be placed on carbon emissions: 
 
One of the great side effects of moving to renewable power is that we will replace 
vulnerable, brittle centralized systems that are too big to fail with spread out 
democratic energy sources small enough to be resilient. As such, it is clear that 
significant social, political and behavioral changes are required to address global 
warming. This, when coupled with proposals like the democratization of the 
energy grid, which would involve decentralizing its control, could very well form 
the basis of a comprehensive solution to anthropogenic climate change (Battaglini 
et al., 2009). 
 
 
 
[This paper is over the 4000-6000 requested word count for papers. What can you cut? 
We can push a little beyond 6000, but this is too far over. Is there a section that is 
expendable? Do you need to go into detail on the methods of geoengineering? Thanks] 
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